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Abstract. The Existence of Jemaah Islamiyah in the 
world, particularly in Indonesia, cannot be 
underestimated by the Indonesian government. It is 
extremely needed a serious attention to tackle this 
movement. This essay entails a strong network between 
JI in Indonesia and al-Qaedah Link in Afganistasn. 
Although the emergence of JI in Indonesia cannot be 
separated from a former rebellion to the Indonesia New 
Order which was called Darul Islam, the development 
of JI has remarkably changed through building strong 
networking to international link like al-Qaedah. A 
number of evidence has been provided in this article to 
strengthen the danger of this organization. The doctrine 
of jihad through suicide bombing fuels the threat of JI 
as an international terrorist organization. Jihad was 
believed as the holy war against the United States, Israel, 
Europe, and anyone else who oppose their vision of 
world governed by shariah. JI itself were supported by 
multitude schools, charitable associations, banks, 
business activities and Islamic world government.    
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Introduction 
Of all series bomb attack happened in Indonesia, Bali 
bomb, on 12 October 2002, is widely considered as the most 
serious explosion by terrorist since 9/11. The Bali bomb attack 
was reported 202 people killed, including 88 Australians, and 
350 people were seriously injured.  It certainly came as a shock 
to Indonesian government and all parts of the world. Bali was 
previously called as a paradise of the earth, it has remarkably 
changed into a centre of terrorist. In this regard, Jemaah 
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Islamiyah (JI) was believed as the actor for this shocking bomb. 
Jemaah Islamiyah, as contended by Pevlova (2006), is an Arabic 
term which connotes “a society of muslims” or “a worldwide 
community of Muslims”.1  Jones (2005) noted that Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) is probably the most popular ever known of all the 
Islamic terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. It is 
responsible of a series of bombings in Indonesia since May 
2002 and continued through the explosion in front of the 
Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004. JI members, 
as Jones (2005) continues, have been involved in many of the 
major bombings in Philippines between 2000 and early 2005. In 
all cases, the bombs were designed to kill innocent people or 
civilian. This result in the United Nations lists them as the 
terrorist organization.2 
According to Korschade (2006), JI was formed from the 
Darul Islam separatist movement in Indonesia during the 
1950s. The goal of Darul Islam was the creation of an 
Indonesian Islamic state, and the movement was responsible 
for several uprisings through the 1950s and 1960s in Indonesia. 
Although Darul Islam was suppressed and forced to operate 
underground during the late mid-1960s, several armed militant 
organizations formed from the group in the mid to late 1980s; 
one of these was JI. JI established radical Islamic boarding 
schools, and expanded their influence into Malaysia and 
throughout South East Asia. JI recruits trained in Afghanistan 
from 1985, after being tunneled through Makhtab al-Khadamat lil 
Mujahideen al-Arab (Afghan Services Bureau) to Camp Saddah, 
in which recruits were schooled in a three-year training course 
that consisted of weapons, tactics, and explosives instruction, 
combined with strict salafist indoctrination. The last class for 
Afghan training of JI members arrived in 1991, following the 
Soviet withdrawal. The subsequent year, following a 
disagreement between JI leader Sungkar and another senior 
Darul Islam leader, Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar established JI as 
																																								 																				
1See, Elena Pavlova, “From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State 
Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism. 30, (2007), pp.777-800  
2See, Sydney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah”, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59,2 (2005),pp.169-178.  
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an organization distinct from Darul Islam.  JI now had the 
unambiguous goal of establishing a pan-Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia.  From 2000, JI attempted to assassinate the 
Philippines Ambassador to Indonesia, detonated 38 bombs in 
churches across the Indonesian archipelago, and attempted to 
assassinate Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri.3 
Baker (2005) point out that JI, as an Islam militant 
organization, use terrorism as the medium to create pan-Asian 
Islamic state  centered in Indonesia. JI has been closely 
associated with al-Qaidah network, both and before 9/11 attack. 
Since 2001, many JI leaders and members have been arrested, 
imprisoned, such as spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir. Others 
have been killed resisting arrest as Abuza (2003) stated that 
more than 160 JI members were arrested. According to Baker 
(2005), the remaining JI members have demonstrated a 
continuing ability to execute major terrorist attacks. 
Nevertheless, as contended by Abuza (2003), JI powers to 
attack become lesser and lesser than they were years ago.  
Based on the explanation above, it is clearly demonstrated 
JI posed a message that they are a large terrorist organization in 
Southeast Asia. That’s why Barton (2005, cited in Tan, 2006) 
suggests that although the quantity of radical Islam in Indonesia 
is limited compared to Muslim population in this country, we 
need to give it serious attention due to creeping radicalization. 
From these points of view, this paper will address Jemaah 
Islamiyah in terms of its pattern of organization, financial 
network, link to al-Qaeda, and more importantly the concept of 
suicide bombing.4 
 
The Pattern of Organization 
JI as an international organization is a top down 
command. According to Baker (2005), JI consists of the Emir, 
or supreme leader and the Regional Syura, a consultative council 
of senior JI members. Emir, as stated by Pavlova (2006), is 
																																								 																				
3Stuart Koschade, S., “A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah 
Islamiyah: The application to Counter Terrorism and Intelligence”, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 29 (2006), pp.559-575.  
4See, Andrew T.H. Tan, “Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islam in 
Indonesia (Book Review)”, Pacific Affairs.  79, 1 (2006), pp 149-151.   
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normally assisted by Qiyadah (Executive) in conducting his 
administrative duties.5  In this sense, Abu Bakar Baasyir served 
as the JIs’ Emir at least until he was arrested and taken into 
custody by Indonesian authorities. Some regard him as the 
spiritual leader rather than top decision maker. Baasyir was 
suggested that he was in charge with series of bombing attack 
across the country through educating and exhorting the radical 
Muslims who resorts to violence. Baasyir was accompanied by 
Abdullah Sungkar, who saw themselves as the descendants of 
earlier Muslim separatist movement, such as Darul Islam, and 
spent decades working to promote Islamic fundamentalism in 
Southeast Asia.6  
Baker (2005) goes on to state that the Regional Syura 
involves the JIs’ senior personnel and serves as a top policy 
making group. It is equivalent to the Shura Majlis, or 
consultative council that al-Qaeda has used to its top liberations. 
This has several functional components, such as operations, 
security, recruitment, and communication. Both operations and 
security are crucial to JIs’ ability to undertake terrorist attack.7 
According to Jones (2005), JI established four major 
territorial divisions known as the mantiqi, with responsibilities 
for JI operations across Southeast Asia, as follow: 
1. Mantiqi 1 covering peninsular Malaysia, Singapore and 
Southern Thailand. Baker (2005) stated that this group 
works in conjunction with Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia 
(KMM). This group mainly concentrates on recruitment 
and indoctrination of JI members, particularly through 
the Islamic boarding school in Johor Malaysia. According 
to Desker (2003), this mantiqi is regarded as providing the 
economic wherewithal for operations. 
2. Mantiqi 2 covering Java, Sumatera, and most of other 
major islands of Indonesia except for Sulawesi. It plays an 
important role in supporting JI activities in Indonesia’s 
																																								 																				
5See Elena, loc. cit  
6John C. Baker, “Jemaah Islamiyah” in Brian Jackson et al (ed.), 
Aptitude for Destruction: Organizational Learning in terrorist groups and its 
implications for combating terrorism. National Institute of Justice: Rand 
infrastructure and Environment, 2003.  
7 See ibid.,  
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sectarian conflict through Islamic paramilitary groups or 
further called jihad. 
3. Mantiqi 3 covering the Philippines, Sabah in eastern 
Malaysia, Sulawesi, and eastern Kalimantan. This group 
has been important for training JI personnel and 
supporting its logical network, including the use of MILF 
training facilities in Mindanao. 
4. Mantiqi 4 covering Australia that focuses primarily on 
recruiting and fundraising in the large Indonesia diaspora 
community.8    
These territorial groups, as contended by Baker (2005), 
consist of several branches known as wakalahs, which comprise 
operations cell, or fiah, that normally consist of four or five JI 
members. Desker (2003) compares the mantiqi and wakalah to 
brigades and batallions, and so on all the way down to the fiah 
squads. Although JIs’ organizational structure suggests a 
hierarchical organization, it was frequently happened that there 
is strong differences of perspective have existed within the 
organization, especially in terms of Jihad.9 
In relation to the sustainability of leadership in four 
mantiqi, Jones (2005) stated that Mantiqi 1 had already collapsed 
due the arrest of the leader. That is, however, not to say that it 
will disrupt the future of JI. Until 2003,  many of JIs’ top chief 
leaders for mantiqi 1 were believed to involve in designing Bali 
bomb. Nevertheless, they tended to be more internationalist in 
outlook than other parts of the organization  and were more 
attracted by al-qaeda    
 
Financial Network 
According to Abuza (2003), there are at least eight 
financial sources of JI in operating their attack. However, only 
two of them will be explored in detail in this paper, bags of cash 
and Islamic charities. 
 
Bag of  Cash 
																																								 																				
8See, Sydney, loc cit.,  
9See, Barry Desker,”The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in 
Singapore. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 25, 3 (2003), pp.489.  
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Delivery of cash by personal couriers is the most popular 
way of funding JI operations. According to Malaysian and 
Singaporean intelligent reports (cited in Abuza, 2003), the JI 
received some Rp1.35 billion from al-Qaeda since 1996. 
According to Regional intelligence officials, that year, the JI 
received Rp250 million, Rp400 million in 1997 and Rp700 
million in 2000 (roughly US$40,000 and US$70,000 
respectively). Umar al-Faruq testified to transferring 
US$200,000 to the JIs’ Indonesian cell after 2000.10  
Syeikh Abu Abdullah al-Emarati, was popular called 
Usama bin Laden, was reported to fund JI operations about 
US$74,000 through giving Umar al-Faruq to purchase three 
tons of explosives for JI operations. The Bali bomb was funded 
by US$35,000 transferred by Wan Min Mat, believed to be an 
important JI treasurer in Malaysia, to Mukhlas and Imam 
Samudra, the key actors of the Bali bombing. However, as 
Baker (2005) view, the fund was frequently insufficient, 
particularly to support a larger bombing attack. In this sense, JI 
members had to rely on criminal activities, such as the robbery 
of a jewelry store, to generate the cash it needed as it happened 
in the Bali bomb attack.11  
 
Is lamic Chari t i es  
Abuza (2003) stated that much of al-Qaedas’ as well as 
JIs’ funding are believed to come from charities. Indonesian 
intelligence officials estimate that 15 to 20 percent of Islamic 
charity funds are diverted to politically motivated groups and 
terrorist. In Islamic culture, Muslims are expected to donate 2.5 
percent of their net revenue to charity, known as zakat. It is a 
compulsory to every single Muslim through taking some their 
wealth out to distribute poor people or worthy people. This 
practice is unregulated, unedited, and thus leads to terrible 
abuse by groups such as al-Qaeda. There are some 300 private 
																																								 																				
10See, Zachari Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The 
Financial Network of al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Contemporary Southeast 
Asia. 25,2 (2003), pp. 169.  
11See	ibid.,		
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charities in Saudi Arabia alone, including 20 established by 
Saudi intelligence to fund the Afgan Mujahidin. It is estimated 
that US$1.6 million per day is donated by wealthy Saudi. Thus, 
Saudi Arabia is believed as the most important source of fund 
of al-Qaeda as well as JI.12 
Despite zakat donations, which are obligatory, there are 
also infaq and sadaqah donations which are voluntary and made 
depending on individual circumstances. This is completely 
unregulated, allowing for financial mismanagement and the 
diversion of funds to terrorist cells.    
 
Links to al-Qaeda 
According to Baker (2005), the first contact between JI 
and al-Qaeda started when Abdullah Sungkar traveled to 
Afganistan and met with Osama bin Laden some time in 1993-
1994. Afterwards, both JI and al-Qaeda make agreement to 
engaged in a number of activities that benefited both of them. 
The main benefit of JI is access to al-Qaeda training facilities, 
financial support, and the ability to plan and carry out joint 
operations.13 Likewise, al-Qaeda take advantage from this 
relationship through gaining support form JI to support 
terrorist attacks on targets in the region and elsewhere.  
The following table clearly demonstrates the chronology 
of interaction between JI and al-Qaeda. 
 
Table  1 .  Key  in t e rac t ions  be tween JI  and a l -Qaeda 
Date Key Interaction 
1993–1994 
 
 
1999–2000 
 
 
 
 
January 2000 
 
 
JI is formed by Abdullah Sungkar after a meeting with 
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. 
 
Singapore Fiah Ayub cell leader goes to Afghanistan for 
training in mid-1999 and later briefs the al Qaeda 
leadership on JI preparations for a bombing attack on a 
rail station in Singapore that is routinely used by U.S. 
military personnel. 
 
Hambali, serving both JI and al Qaeda, helps arrange a 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur that involves some top al 
																																								 																				
12See ibid.,  
13See John, loc. cit.,  
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2000–2002 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
September 
2001– 
October 2001 
Qaeda operatives involved in the 9/11 plot as hijackers 
and the USS Cole attack 
 
Omar al-Faruq, al Qaeda’s senior representative in 
Southeast Asia, works with the JI to undertake 
surveillance of the U.S. embassies in Jakarta and Kuala 
Lumpur in preparation for a car bomb attack. 
 
JI member Yazid Sufaat spends several months trying 
to cultivate anthrax as part of the al Qaeda biological 
weapons program at a laboratory in Afghanistan. 
 
JI’s Fiah Musa cell in Singapore is approached by JI 
leaders and al Qaeda operatives to assist in a plan to 
bomb specific targets in Singapore (e.g., embassies, U.S. 
business offices); the plan calls for JI personnel to 
undertake surveillance and bomb preparations and 
support activities for al Qaeda suicide truck bombers. 
Source:s White Paper, 2003, pp 4-5, 9-12 (cited in Baker, 2003) 
 
Suicide bombing : the noble j ihad  
According to Pavlova (2007), Jemaah Islamiyah based 
themselves on salafi-jihadist religious principles and a rigorous 
methodology of self discipline, inter-body consultation, and 
internal control mechanism. There are at least three emphasis 
of JI movement as follow: 
1. The emphasis on Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state) as a 
framework toward the restoration of the global Islamic 
caliphate. However, Jones (2005) stated that JI 
organization merely focus on establishing an Islamic state 
in Indonesia, not a caliphate, not a regional Islamic state 
in Southeast Asia. 
2. The preparation of establishing Daulah Islamiyah through 
a persistent of the individual, the familiy, and the jamaah 
as Islamic entities 
3. Concentrate on military training and Jihad musallah (armed 
struggle) as the final outcome and the ultimate test of 
success for JI long term target. 
Those three important movements, jihad is becoming the 
most serious concern of the JI. Jihad, to them, will bring 
peoples’ qualities to the fore and highlight their potential. It was 
believed that jihad is the most virtues in the group ethos. This 
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principle is strengthened by JI members to prepare them to 
fight till death in the name of the groups’ religious vision and 
strategic vision.  
In general, the notion of jihad, as contended by 
Khosrokavhar (2002), first emerged in Arabia as a result of 
Islam’s ideologicalisation of tribal warfare. Incessant warfare 
between various tribes was frequent in Arabia, where the 
heterogeneity between different religious communities (Jewish, 
Christian and pagan) and divergent interests resulted in 
constant fighting. Islam gave this type of warfare a unitary 
meaning by giving it a religious content. Initially, the meaning 
of jihad fluctuated to a greater or lesser extent. It gradually took 
on the codified meaning of ‘for the cause of God’ as the 
universalism gradually established by Islam transcended tribal 
rivalries and intertribal economic struggles.14 
Jihad, to JI, is the duty of a Muslim to avenge. This can be 
seen when Fealy (2003) interviewed Amrozi (one of the Bali 
bombers) saying that “I carry out jihad because it’s the duty of 
Muslim, so (that) the America terrorist and their allies 
understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not 
shed for nothing”. Likewise, Imam Samudra stated that “let it 
be acknowledged that every single drop of Muslim blood, be it 
from any nationality and from any place will be remembered 
and accounted for”. From these points of view, it is obvious 
that jihad (armed fighting) is the noble movement among the 
JI.15  
Fealy (2003) continues to say that many bombers saw 
themselves as fighting a heroic was against evil. They portray 
themselves as high minded warriors acting according to the 
demands of their faith. Indeed, many JI members have stated 
that they are engaged in a holy struggle and are happy to die as 
the martyrs for the cause. Imam Samudra, for example, stated: 
I have not done anything barbaric that is prohibited by 
God. The precise path I have taken is Gods’ path. Have 
																																								 																				
14See, Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs. 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002).  
15See, Greg Fealy, “Hating Americans: Jemaah Islamiyah and The 
Bali Bombing. IIAS Newsletter. 31 (2003), pp3-4.  
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faith that the soldiers of Muhammad will win. However, 
that victory will certainly have victims. Be certain that I 
am on the road of istiqamah (sincerity), the road of jihad. 
Even if I die, I will die a martyr. I await the enemys’ 
bullet or spear piercing my breast so that I die a martyr.16  
 
From these points of view, it is shown that the driving 
force of committing suicide bombing is jihad. It plays an 
important role to guide JI members to attack Western people. 
Thus, the following table clearly demonstrates a serious of 
bomb attack by JI members. Some of them were performed by 
suicide bombing.  
 
Table 2.  JI Bomb attacks,  2000-2004 
Date Target and Location Type of attack and result 
August 1, 2000 Residence of the Philippine 
ambassador 
to Indonesia (Jakarta) 
Single car bomb: 3 
killed, 17 wounded 
December 24, 
2000 
Churches and priests in 
Indonesia (11 
cities across Java and 
Sumatra) 
Christmas Eve 
bombings—38 bombs 
(20 
detonated): 15 killed, 
94 wounded 
December 30, 
2000 
Metro Manila, including the 
light rail 
Train 
Five near-simultaneous 
bombings; 14 killed, 70 
wounded 
Late 2001 Foreign embassies (U.S., 
Israel, UK, 
Australia), U.S. naval ships, 
and other 
Western interests in 
Singapore 
Six large truck bombs: 
foiled by Singapore 
police arrests in 
December 2001 
October 12, 
2002 
2 Bali nightclubs (Kuta, 
Bali) and the 
U.S. consulate (Sanur, Bali) 
One large car bomb 
and two smaller 
bombs: 202 killed, over 
500 wounded 
August 5, 2003 J.W. Marriott Hotel 
(Jakarta) 
Single car bomb: 12 
killed, numerous 
Wounded 
September 9, Australian embassy Single truck van bomb: 
																																								 																				
16See, ibid.,  
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2004 (Jakarta) 9 killed, nearly 
100 wounded 
Source : Report of the Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence 
Agencies, 2004, p. 41; White Paper, 2003; various TEMPO Magazine 
articles. (cited in Baker, 2003) 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the explanations above, it can be regarded that 
JI is a serious terrorist organization that need to be concerned 
among the government, particularly, Indonesian authority 
where JI centered. The strength financial network with al-
Qaeda showed how JI is an international terrorist organization 
that may threat the harmonious and peaceful of the world. 
Additionally, the concept of jihad which results in committing 
suicide bombing fuels the danger of this organization. 
Although, the three Bali bombers, Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Imam 
Samudra, have been executed by Indonesian prosecutor, the 
rest of JI members are considered to exist across the country. 
Thus, an attempt to tackle the expansion of this organization is 
necessarily required. 
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